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ABSTRACT
The arms race between attacks and defenses for machine learn-
ing models has come to a forefront in recent years, in both the
security community and the privacy community. However, one big
limitation of previous research is that the security domain and the
privacy domain have typically been considered separately. It is thus
unclear whether the defense methods in one domain will have any
unexpected impact on the other domain.
In this paper, we take a step towards resolving this limitation by
combining the two domains. In particular, we measure the success of
membership inference attacks against six state-of-the-art adversarial
defense methods that mitigate adversarial examples (i.e., evasion
attacks). Membership inference attacks aim to infer an individual’s
participation in the target model’s training set and are known to
be correlated with target model’s overfitting and sensitivity with
regard to training data. Meanwhile, adversarial defense methods
aim to enhance the robustness of target models by ensuring that
model predictions are unchanged for a small area around each
training sample. Thus, adversarial defenses typically have a more
fine-grained reliance on the training set and make the target model
more vulnerable to membership inference attacks.
To perform the membership inference attacks, we leverage the
conventional inference method based on prediction confidence and
propose two new inference methods that exploit structural proper-
ties of adversarially robust defenses. Our experimental evaluation
demonstrates that compared with the natural training (undefended)
approach, adversarial defense methods can indeed increase the target
model’s risk against membership inference attacks. When applying
adversarial defenses to train the robust models, the membership
inference advantage increases by up to 4.5 times compared to the
naturally undefended models. Beyond revealing the privacy risks
of adversarial defenses, we further investigate the factors that in-
fluence the membership information leakage and study the effect
of potential countermeasures.
1 INTRODUCTION
Machine learning models, especially deep neural networks, have
been deployed prominently in many real-world applications, such
as image classification [26, 44], speech recognition [9, 21], natural
language processing [2, 8], and game playing [32, 43]. However,
since the machine learning algorithms were originally designed
without considering potential adversarial threats, their security and
privacy vulnerabilities have come to a forefront in recent years,
together with the arms race between attacks and defenses [6, 22, 36].
In the security domain, the adversary aims to induce misclassifi-
cations to the target machine learning model, with attack methods
divided into two categories: evasion attacks and poisoning attacks
[22]. Evasion attacks, also known as adversarial examples, perturb
inputs at the test time to induce wrong predictions by the target
model [4, 7, 15, 35, 51]. In contrast, poisoning attacks target the
training process by maliciously modifying part of training data to
cause the trained model to misbehave on some test inputs [5, 25, 40].
In response to these attacks, the security community has designed
new training algorithms to secure machine learning models against
evasion attacks [16, 30, 31, 45, 56, 61] or poisoning attacks [23, 50].
In the privacy domain, the adversary aims to obtain private
information about the training data or the target model. Attacks
targeting data privacy include: the adversary inferring whether
input examples were used to train the target model with member-
ship inference attacks [38, 42, 59], learning global properties of
training data with property inference attacks [12], reconstructing
training data with model inversion attacks [10, 11] or colluding
model training attacks [47, 59]. Attacks targeting model privacy
include: the adversary unconvering the model details with model
extraction attacks [53], and inferring hyperparameters with hy-
perparameter stealing attacks [55]. In response to these attacks,
the privacy community has designed defenses to prevent privacy
leakage of training data [1, 19, 33, 41] or the target model [24, 28].
However, one important limitation of current machine learning
defenses is that they typically focus solely on either the security
domain or the privacy domain. It is thus unclear whether defense
methods in one domain will have any unexpected impact on the
other domain. In this paper, we take a step towards enhancing our
understanding of machine learning models when both the security
domain and privacy domain are combined together. In particu-
lar, we seek to understand the privacy risks of securing machine
learning models by evaluatingmembership inference attacks against
adversarially robust deep learning models, which aim to mitigate the
threat of adversarial examples.
The membership inference attack aims to infer whether a data
point is part of the target model’s training set or not, posing a
serious privacy risk as the membership can reveal an individual’s
sensitive information. For example, participation in a hospital’s
health analytic training set means that an individual was once a
patient in that hospital. It has been shown that the success of mem-
bership inference attacks is highly related to the target model’s
overfitting and sensitivity as to training data [38, 42, 59]. Adversar-
ially robust models aim to enhance the robustness of target models
by ensuring that model predictions are unchanged for a small area
(such as l∞ ball) around each training example. Intuitively, adversar-
ially robust models have the potential to overfit on the training set
and increase the model sensitivity, resulting in an enhanced risk of
membership inference attacks. As an example, Figure 1 shows the
histogram of cross-entropy loss values of training data and test data
for both naturally undefended and adversarially robust CIFAR10
1
ar
X
iv
:1
90
5.
10
29
1v
2 
 [s
tat
.M
L]
  2
7 M
ay
 20
19
(a) Adversarially robust model fromMadry et al. [30], with 99% train
accuracy and 87% test accuracy.
(b) Naturally undefended model, with 100% train accuracy and 95%
test accuracy. Around 23% training and test examples have zero loss.
Figure 1: Histogram of CIFAR10 classifiers’ loss values of training data (members) and test data (non-members). We can see
the larger divergence between the loss distribution over members and non-members on the robust model as compared to the
natural model. This shows the privacy risk of securing deep learning models against adversarial examples.
classifiers provided by Madry et al. [30]. We can see that members
(training data) and non-members (test data) can be distinguished
more easily for the robust model, compared to the natural model.
To measure the membership inference risks of adversarially
robust models, besides the conventional inference method based
on prediction confidence, we propose two new inference meth-
ods that exploit the structural properties of adversarial defenses.
We measure the privacy risks of robust models trained with six
state-of-the-art adversarial defense methods, and find that adver-
sarially robust models are indeed more susceptible to membership
inference attacks than naturally undefended models. We further
perform a comprehensive investigation to analyze the relation be-
tween privacy leakage and model properties, and study the effect of
countermeasures such as temperature scaling and regularization.
In summary, we make the following contributions in this paper:
(1) We propose two newmembership inference attacks specific
to adversarially robust models by exploiting adversarial
examples’ predictions and verified worst-case predictions.
With these two new methods, we can achieve higher in-
ference accuraies than the conventional inference method
based on prediction confidence of benign inputs.
(2) We performmembership inference attacks onmodels trained
with six state-of-the-art adversarial defense methods (3
empirical defenses [30, 45, 61] and 3 verifiable defenses
[16, 31, 56]). We demonstrate that all methods indeed in-
crease the model’s membership inference risk. By defining
the membership inference advantage as the increase in
inference accuracy over random guessing (multiplied by
2) [59], we show that robust machine learning models can
incur a membership inference advantage 4.5×, 2.1×, 3.5×
times the membership inference advantage of naturally
undefended models, on Yale Face, Fashion-MNIST, and
CIFAR10 datasets, respectively.
(3) We further explore the factors that influence the mem-
bership inference performance of the adversarially robust
model, including its robustness generalization, the adver-
sarial perturbation constraint, and the model capacity.
(4) We study the effect of potential countermeasures, including
temperature scaling and regularization, to reduce privacy
leakage via membership inference attacks.
Some of our analysis was briefly discussed in a short workshop
paper [48]. In this paper, we go further by proposing two new
membership inference attacks and measuring four more adversarial
defense methods, where we show that all adversarial defenses can
increase the privacy risks of target models. We also perform a
comprehensive investigation of factors that impact the privacy
risks and discuss potential countermeasures.
2 BACKGROUND AND RELATEDWORK:
ADVERSARIAL EXAMPLES AND
MEMBERSHIP INFERENCE ATTACKS
In this section, we first present the background and related work on
adversarial examples and defenses, and then discuss membership
inference attacks.
2.1 Adversarial Examples and Defenses
Let Fθ : Rd → Rk be a machine learning model with d input
features and k output classes, parameterized by weights θ . For an
example z = (x,y) with the input feature x and the ground truth
label y, the model outputs a prediction vector over all class labels
Fθ (x) with
∑k−1
i=0 Fθ (x)i = 1, and the final prediction will be the
label with the largest prediction probability yˆ = argmaxi Fθ (x)i .
For neural networks, the outputs of its penultimate layer are known
as logits, and we represent them as a vector дθ (x). The softmax
function is then computed on logits to obtain final prediction vector.
Fθ (x)i =
exp (дθ (x)i )∑k−1
j=0 exp (дθ (x)j )
(1)
Given a training setDtrain, the natural training algorithm aims to
make model predictions match ground truth labels by minimizing
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the prediction loss over all training examples.
min
θ
1
|Dtrain |
∑
z∈Dtrain
ℓ(Fθ , z), (2)
where |Dtrain | denotes the size of training set, and ℓ computes the
prediction loss. A widely-adopted loss function is the cross-entropy
loss:
ℓ(Fθ , z) = −
k−1∑
i=0
1{i = y} · log(Fθ (x)i ), (3)
where 1{·} is the indicator function.
2.1.1 Adversarial examples: Although machine learning models
have achieved tremendous success in many classification scenarios,
they have been found to be easily fooled by adversarial examples
[4, 7, 15, 35, 51]. Adversarial examples induce incorrect classifi-
cations to target models, and can be generated via imperceptible
perturbations to benign inputs.
argmax
i
Fθ (x˜)i , y, such that x˜ ∈ Bϵ (x), (4)
where Bϵ (x) denotes the set of points around x within the per-
turbation budget of ϵ . Usually a lp ball is chosen as the perturba-
tion constraint for generating adversarial examples i.e., Bϵ (x) =
{x′ | ∥x′ − x∥p ≤ ϵ}. We consider the l∞-ball adversarial constraint
throughout the paper, as it is widely adopted by most adversarial
defense methods [16, 30, 31, 37, 45, 56, 61].
The solution to Equation (4) is called an “untargeted adversarial
example” as the adversarial goal is to achieve any incorrect classi-
fication. In comparison, a “targeted adversarial example” ensures
that the model prediction is a specified incorrect label y′, which is
not equal to y.
argmax
i
Fθ (x˜)i = y′, such that x˜ ∈ Bϵ (x). (5)
Unless otherwise specified, an adversarial example in this paper
refers to an untargeted adversarial example.
To provide adversarial robustness under the perturbation con-
straint Bϵ , instead of natural training algorithm shown in Equation
(2), a robust training algorithm is adopted by adding an additional
robust loss function.
min
θ
1
|Dtrain |
∑
z∈Dtrain
α · ℓ(Fθ , z) + (1 − α) · ℓR (Fθ , z,Bϵ ), (6)
where α is the ratio to trade off natural loss and robust loss, and ℓR
measures the robust loss, which can be formulated as maximizing
prediction loss ℓ′ under the constraint Bϵ .
ℓR (Fθ , z,Bϵ ) = max
x˜∈Bϵ (x )
ℓ′(Fθ , (x˜,y)) (7)
ℓ′ can be same as ℓ or other appropriate loss functions.
However, it is usually hard to find the exact solution to Equation
(7). Therefore, the adversarial defenses propose different ways to
approximate the robust loss ℓR , which can be divided into two
categories: empirical defenses and verifiable defenses.
2.1.2 Empirical defenses: Empirical defense methods approxi-
mate robust loss values by generating adversarial examples xadv
at each training step with state-of-the-art attack methods and com-
puting their prediction loss. Now the robust training algorithm can
be expressed as following.
min
θ
1
|Dtrain |
∑
z∈Dtrain
α · ℓ(Fθ , z) + (1 − α) · ℓ′(Fθ , (xadv ,y)) (8)
Three of our tested adversarial defense methods belong to this
category, which are described as follows.
PGD-BasedAdversarial Training (PGD-BasedAdv-Train) [30]:
Madry et al. [30] propose one of the most effective empirical defense
methods by using the projected gradient descent (PGD) method to
generate adversarial examples for maximizing cross-entropy loss
(ℓ′ = ℓ) and training purely on those adversarial examples (α = 0).
The PGD attack contains T gradient descent steps, which can be
expressed as
x˜t+1 = ΠBϵ (x)[x˜t + η · sign( ∇x˜t ℓ(Fθ , (x˜t ,y)) )], (9)
where x˜0 = x, xadv = x˜T , η is the step size value, ∇ denotes the
gradient computation, and ΠBϵ (x) means the projection onto the
perturbation constraint Bϵ (x).
Distributional Adversarial Training (Dist-Based Adv-Train)
[45]: Instead of strictly satisfying the perturbation constraint with
projection step ΠBϵ (x) as in PGD attacks, Sinha et al. [45] generate
adversarial examples by solving the Lagrangian relaxation of cross-
entropy loss:
max
x˜
ℓ(Fθ , (x˜,y)) − γ ∥x˜ − x∥p , (10)
where γ is the penalty parameter for the lp distance. A multi-step
gradient descent method is adopted to solve Equation (10). The
model will then be trained on the cross-loss entropy (ℓ′ = ℓ) of
adversarial examples only (α = 0).
Sinha et al. [45] derive a statistical guarantee for l2 distributional
robustness with strict conditions requiring the loss function ℓ to
be smooth on x, which are not satisfied in our setting. We mainly
use widely-adopted ReLU activation functions for our machine
learning models, which result in a non-smooth loss function. Also,
we generate adversarial examples with l∞ distance penalties by
using the algorithm proposed by Sinha et al. [45] in Appendix E,
where there is no robustness guarantee. Thus, we categorize the
defense method as empirical.
Difference-basedAdversarial Training (Diff-BasedAdv-Train)
[61]: Instead of using the cross-entropy loss of adversarial exam-
ples, with insights from a toy binary classification task, Zhang et
al. [61] propose to use the difference (e.g., Kullback-Leibler (KL)
divergence) between the benign output Fθ (x) and the adversarial
output Fθ (xadv ) as the loss function ℓ′, and combine it with natural
cross entropy loss (α , 0).
ℓ′(Fθ , (xadv ,y)) = dkl (Fθ (xadv ), Fθ (x)), (11)
where dkl computes the KL divergence. Adversarial examples are
also generated with PGD-based attacks, except that now the attack
goal is to maximize the output difference,
x˜t+1 = ΠBϵ (x)[x˜t + η · sign( ∇x˜tdkl (Fθ (x˜t ), Fθ (x)) )]. (12)
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2.1.3 Verifiable defenses: Although empirical defense methods
are effective against state-of-the-art adversarial examples [3], there
is no guarantee for such robustness. To obtain a guarantee for ro-
bustness, verification approaches have been proposed to compute
an upper bound of prediction loss ℓ′ under the adversarial pertur-
bation constraint Bϵ . If the input can still be predicted correctly in
the verified worst case, then it is certain that there is no misclassifi-
cation existing under Bϵ .
Thus, verifiable defense methods take the verification process
into consideration during training by using the verified worst case
prediction loss as robust loss value ℓR . Now the robust training
algorithm becomes
min
θ
1
|Dtrain |
∑
z∈Dtrain
α ·ℓ(Fθ , z)+(1−α)·V(ℓ′(Fθ , (x˜,y)),Bϵ ), (13)
whereV means verified upper bound computation of prediction
loss ℓ′ under the adversarial perturbation constraint Bϵ . In this
paper, we consider the following three verifiable defense method.
Duality-BasedVerification (Dual-BasedVerify) [56]:Wong and
Kolter [56] compute the verified worst-case loss by solving its dual
problem with convex relaxation on non-convex ReLU operations
and then minimize this overapproximated robust loss values only
(α = 0, ℓ′ = ℓ). They further combine this duality relaxationmethod
with the random projection technique to scale to more complex
neural network architectures [57], like ResNet [20].
Abstract Interpretation-Based Verification (Abs-Based Ver-
ify) [31]: Mirman et al. [31] leverage the technique of abstract
interpretation to compute the worse-case loss: an abstract domain
(such as interval domain, zonotope domain [13]) is used to express
the adversarial perturbation constraint Bϵ at the input layer, and by
applying abstract transformers on it, the maximum verified range
of model output is obtained. They adopt a softplus function on the
logits дθ (x˜) to compute the robust loss value and then combine it
with natural training loss (α , 0)
ℓ′(Fθ , (x˜,y)) = log ( exp (maxy′,y дθ (x˜)y′ − дθ (x˜)y ) + 1 ) (14)
Interval Bound Propagation-Based Verification (IBP-Based
Verify) [16]: Gowal et al. [16] share a similar design as Mirman
et al. [31]: they express the constraint Bϵ as a bounded interval
domain (one specified domain considered by Mirman et al. [31])
and propagate this bound to the output layer. The robust loss is
computed as a cross-entropy loss of verified worse-case outputs
(ℓ′ = ℓ) and then combined with natural prediction loss (α , 0) as
the final loss value during training.
2.2 Membership Inference Attacks
For a target machine learning model, the membership inference
attacks aim to determine whether a given data point was used to
train the model or not [18, 29, 34, 38, 42, 59]. The attack poses a
serious privacy risk to the individuals whose data is used for model
training, for example in the setting of health analytics.
Shokri et al. [42] design a membership inference attack method
based on training an inference model to distinguish between pre-
dictions on training set members versus non-members. To train the
inference model, they introduce the shadow training technique: (1)
the adversary first trains multiple “shadow models” which simulate
the behavior of the target model, (2) based on the shadow models’
outputs on their own training and test examples, the adversary
obtains a labeled (member vs non-member) dataset, and (3) finally
trains the inference model as a neural network to perform mem-
bership inference attack against the target model. The input to the
inference model is the prediction vector of the target model on a
target data record.
A simpler inference model, such as a linear classifier, can also
distinguish significantly vulnerable members from non-members.
Yeom et al. [59] suggest comparing the prediction confidence value
of a target example with a threshold (learned for example through
shadow training). Large confidence indicates membership. Their
experiment results show that such a simple inference model is
reasonably effective and achieve membership inference accuracy
close to that of the shadow training method on target models. In this
paper, we mainly follow this confidence-thresholding membership
inference approach.
3 MEMBERSHIP INFERENCE ATTACKS
AGAINST ROBUST MODELS
In this section, we first present some insights on why training
models to be robust against adversarial examples make them more
susceptible to membership inference attacks. We then formally
present our membership inference attacks.
Throughout the paper, we use “natural (default) model” and
“robust model” to denote the machine learning model with natural
training algorithm and robust training algorithm, respectively. We
also call the unmodified inputs and adversarially perturbed inputs
as “benign examples” and “adversarial examples”. When evaluating
the model’s classification performance, “train accuracy” and “test
accuracy” are used to denote the classification accuracy of benign
examples from training and test sets; “adversarial train accuracy’’
and “adversarial test accuracy” represent the classification accuracy
of adversarial examples from training and test sets; “verified train
accuracy” and “verified test accuracy” measure the classification
accuracy under the verified worst-case predictions from training
and test sets. Finally, an input example is called “secure” when it is
correctly classified by the model for all adversarial perturbations
within the constraint Bϵ , “insecure” otherwise.
The performance of membership inference attacks is highly re-
lated to howmuch overfitted they are on their training data [42, 59].
An extremely simple attack algorithm can infer membership based
on whether or not an input is correctly classified. In this case, it is
clear that a large gap between the target model’s train and test accu-
racy leads to a significant membership inference attack accuracy (as
most members are correctly classified, but not the non-members).
Tsipras et al. [54] and Zhang et al. [61] show that robust training
might lead to a drop in test accuracy (i.e., more overfitting). This
is shown based on both empirical and theoretical analysis on toy
classification tasks. Moreover, the overfitting phenomenon can be
worse for a robust model when evaluating its accuracy on adver-
sarial examples [39, 46]. Thus, compared with the natural models,
the robust models might leak more membership informa-
tion, due to exhibiting a larger generalization error, in both
the benign or adversarial settings.
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The performance of membership inference attack is related to
the target model’s sensitivity with regard to training data [29]. The
sensitivity measure is the influence of one data point on the target
model’s performance by computing its prediction difference, when
trained with and without this data point. Intuitively, when the
target model is more sensitive on a training point, it is more likely
that the membership inference adversary can guess its membership
correctly. The robust training algorithms aim to ensure that model
predictions remain unchanged for a small area (such as the l∞ ball)
around any data point. However, in practice, they guarantee this for
the training examples, thus, magnifying the influence of the training
data on the model. Therefore, compared with the natural training,
the robust training algorithms might make the model more
susceptible to membership inference attacks, by increasing
its sensitivity to its training data.
To validate the above insights, let’s take the natural and the
robust CIFAR10 classifiers provided by Madry et al. [30] as an ex-
ample. From Figure 1, we have seen that compared to the natural
model, the robust model has a larger divergence between the pre-
diction loss of training data and test data. Our fine-grained analysis
in Appendix A further reveals that the large divergence of robust
model is highly related to its robustness performance. Moreover,
the robust model incurs a significant generalization error in the
adversarial setting, with 96% adversarial train accuracy, and only
47% adversarial test accuracy. Finally, we will experimentally show
in Section 5.2.1 that the robust model is indeed more sensitive with
regard to training data.
3.1 Membership Inference Performance
Table 1: Notations formembership inference attacks against
robust machine learning models.
Symbol Description
F Target machine learning model.
Bϵ Adversarial perturbation constraint when training a robust model.
Dtrain Model’s training set.
Dtest Model’s test set.
x Benign (unmodified) input example.
y Ground truth label for the input x.
xadv Adversarial example generated from x.
V Robustness verification to compute verified worst-case predictions.
I Membership inference strategy.
Ainf Membership inference accuracy.
ADVTinf Membership inference advantage compared to random guessing.
In this part, we describe the membership inference attack and
its performance formally, with notations listed in Table 1. For a
neural network model F (we skip its parameter θ for simplicity) that
is robustly trained with the adversarial constraint Bϵ , the mem-
bership inference attack aims to determine whether a given input
example z = (x,y) is in its training set Dtrain or not. We denote the
inference strategy adopted by the adversary as I(F ,Bϵ , z), which
codes members as 1, and non-members as 0.
We use the fraction of correct membership predictions, as the
metric to evaluate membership inference accuracy. We use a test
set Dtest which does not overlap with the training set, to represent
non-members. We sample a random data point (x, y) from either
Dtrain orDtest with an equal 50% probability, to test the membership
inference attack. We measure the membership inference accuracy
as follows.
Ainf (F ,Bϵ ,I) =
∑
z∈Dtrain I(F ,Bϵ , z)
2 · |Dtrain | +
∑
z∈Dtest 1 − I(F ,Bϵ , z)
2 · |Dtest | ,
(15)
where | · | measures the size of a dataset.
According to Equation (15), a random guessing strategy will lead
to a 50% membership inference accuracy. We also use the notion of
membership inference advantage proposed by Yeom et al. [59] to
measure how much improvement our inference strategy obtains
compared to random guessing.
ADVT inf = 2 × (Ainf − 0.5) (16)
3.2 Exploiting the Model’s Predictions on
Benign Examples
We adopt a confidence-thresholding inference strategy due to its
simplicity and effectiveness [59]: an input (x,y) is inferred as mem-
ber if its prediction confidence F (x)y is larger than a preset thresh-
old value. We denote this inference strategy as IB since it relies on
the benign examples’ predictions. We have the following expres-
sions for this inference strategy and its inference accuracy.
IB(F ,Bϵ , (x,y)) =1{F (x)y ≥ τB}
Ainf (F ,Bϵ ,IB) =
1
2 +
1
2 · (
∑
z∈Dtrain 1{F (x)y ≥ τB}
|Dtrain |
−
∑
z∈Dtest 1{F (x)y ≥ τB}
|Dtest | ),
(17)
where 1{·} is the indicator function and the last two terms are
the values of complementary cumulative distribution functions of
training examples’ and test examples’ prediction confidences, at
the point of threshold τB, respectively. In our experiments, we eval-
uate the worst case inference risks by choosing τB to achieve the
highest inference accuracy, i.e., maximizing the gap between two
complementary cumulative distribution function values. In prac-
tice, an adversary can learn the threshold via the shadow training
technique [42].
This inference strategy IB does not leverage the adversarial
constraint Bϵ . In this paper, we propose two new membership
inference strategies by taking Bϵ into consideration, which are
tailored to robust models.
3.3 Exploiting the Model’s Predictions on
Adversarial Examples
Our first new inference strategy is to generate an (untargeted)
adversarial example xadv for input (x,y) under the constraint Bϵ ,
and use a threshold on the model’s prediction confidence on xadv .
We have following expression for this strategy IA and its inference
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accuracy.
IA(F ,Bϵ , (x,y)) =1{F (xadv )y ≥ τA}
Ainf (F ,Bϵ ,IA) =
1
2 +
1
2 · (
∑
z∈Dtrain 1{F (xadv )y ≥ τA}
|Dtrain |
−
∑
z∈Dtest 1{F (xadv )y ≥ τA}
|Dtest | )
(18)
In our experiments, we use the PGD attack method shown in Equa-
tion (9) with the same perturbation constraint Bϵ as in the robust
training process to obtain xadv . We choose the preset threshold
τA to achieve highest inference accuracy, i.e., maximizing the gap
between two complementary cumulative distribution functions of
prediction confidence on adversarial train and test examples.
3.3.1 Targeted adversarial examples. We extend the attack to
exploiting targeted adversarial examples. Targeted adversarial ex-
amples contain information about distance of the benign input
to each label’s decision boundary, and are expected to leak more
membership information than the untargeted adversarial example
which only contains information about distance to a nearby label’s
decision boundary.
We adapt the PGD attack method to find targeted adversarial
examples (Equation (5)) by iteratively minizing the targeted cross-
entropy loss.
x˜t+1 = ΠBϵ (x)[x˜t − η · sign( ∇x˜t ℓ(Fθ , (x˜t ,y′)) )] (19)
The confidence thresholding inference strategy does not apply
for targeted adversarial examples because there exist k − 1 targeted
adversarial examples (we have k − 1 incorrect labels) for each input.
Instead, following Shokri et al. [42], we train a binary inference
classifier for each class label to perform the membership inference
attack. For each class label, we first choose a fraction of training
and test points and generate corresponding targeted adversarial
examples. Next, we compute model predictions on the targeted ad-
versarial examples, and use them to train the membership inference
classifier. Finally, we perform inference attacks using the remaining
training and test points.
3.4 Exploiting the Verified Worst-Case
Predictions on Adversarial Examples
Our attacks above generate adversarial examples using the heuristic
strategy of projected gradient descent. Next, we leverage verification
techniquesV used by the verifiably defended models [16, 31, 56]
to obtain the input’s worst-case predictions under the adversarial
constraint Bϵ . We use the input’s worst-case prediction confidence
to predict its membership. The expressions for this strategy IV and
its inference accuracy are as follows.
IV(F ,Bϵ , (x,y)) =1{V(F (x˜)y ,Bϵ ) ≥ τV}
Ainf (F ,Bϵ ,IV) =
1
2 +
1
2 · (
∑
z∈Dtrain V(F (x˜)y ,Bϵ ) ≥ τV}
|Dtrain |
−
∑
z∈Dtest V(F (x˜)y ,Bϵ ) ≥ τV}
|Dtest | ),
(20)
whereV(F (x˜)y ,Bϵ ) returns the verified worst-case prediction con-
fidence for all examples x˜ satisfying the adversarial perturbation
constraint x˜ ∈ Bϵ (x), and τV is chosen in a similar manner as our
previous two inference strategies.
Note that different verifiable defenses adopt different verifica-
tion methodsV . Our inference strategy uses the same verification
method which is used in the target model’s verifiably robust train-
ing process.
4 EXPERIMENT SETUP
In this section, we describe the datasets, neural network architec-
tures, and corresponding adversarial perturbation constraints that
we use in our experiments. Throughout the paper, we focus on
the l∞ perturbation constraint: Bϵ (x) = {x′ | ∥x′ − x∥∞ ≤ ϵ}. The
detailed architectures are summarized in Appendix B. We will make
our code publicly available to facilitate reproducible experiments
and verification.
Yale Face. The extended Yale Face database B is used to train
face recognition models, and contains gray scale face images of
38 subjects under various lighting conditions [14, 27]. We use the
cropped version of this dataset, where all face images are aligned
and cropped to have the dimension of 168 × 192. In this version,
each subject has 64 images with the same frontal poses under dif-
ferent lighting conditions, among which 18 images were corrupted
during the image acquisition, leading to 2,414 images in total [27].
In our experiments, we select 50 images for each subject to form
the training set (total size is 1,900 images), and use the remaining
514 images as the test set.
For the model architecture, we use a convolutional neural net-
work (CNN) with the convolution kernel size 3 × 3, as suggested
by Simonyan et al. [44]. The CNN model contains 4 blocks with
different numbers of output channels (8, 16, 32, 64), and each block
contains two convolution layers. The first layer uses a stride of
1 for convolutions, and the second layer uses a stride of 2. There
are two fully connected layers after the convolutional layers, each
containing 200 and 38 neurons. When training the robust models,
we set the l∞ perturbation budget (ϵ) to be 8/255.
Fashion-MNIST. This dataset consists of a training set of 60,000
examples and a test set of 10,000 examples [58]. Each example is
a 28 × 28 grayscale image, associated with a class label from 10
fashion products, such as shirt, coat, sneaker.
Similar to Yale Face, we also adopt a CNN architecture with the
convolution kernel size 3 × 3. The model contains 2 blocks with
output channel numbers (256, 512), and each block contains three
convolution layers. The first two layers both use a stride of 1, while
the last layer uses a stride of 2. Two fully connected layers are added
at the end, with 200 and 10 neurons, respectively. When training
the robust models, we set the l∞ perturbation budget (ϵ) to be 0.1.
CIFAR10. This dataset is composed of 32 × 32 color images in
10 classes, with 6,000 images per class. In total, there are 50,000
training images and 10,000 test images.
We use the wide ResNet architecture [60] to train a CIFAR10
classifier, followingMadry et al. [30]. It contains 3 groups of residual
layers with output channel numbers (160, 320, 640) and 5 residual
units for each group. Similarly, two fully connected layer with 200
and 10 neurons are added at the end. When training the robust
models, we set the l∞ perturbation budget (ϵ) to be 8/255.
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5 MEMBERSHIP INFERENCE ATTACKS
AGAINST EMPIRICALLY ROBUST MODELS
In this section we discuss membership inference attacks against 3
empirical defense methods: PGD-based adversarial training (PGD-
Based Adv-Train) [30], distributional adversarial training (Dist-
Based Adv-Train) [45], and difference-based adversarial training
(Diff-Based Adv-Train) [61]. We train the robust models against
the l∞ adversarial constraint on the Yale Face dataset, the Fashion-
MNIST dataset, and the CIFAR10 dataset, with neural network
architecture as described in Section 4. Following previous work [3,
30, 31, 56], the perturbation budget ϵ values are set to be 8/255, 0.1,
and 8/255 on three datasets, respectively. For the empirically robust
model, as explained in Section 2.1, there is no verification process
to obtain robustness guarantee. Thus the membership inference
strategy IV does not apply here.
We first present an overall analysis that compares membership
inference accuracy for natural models and robust models using
multiple inference strategies across multiple datasets. We then
present a deeper analysis of membership inference attacks against
the PGD-based adversarial training defense.
5.1 Overall Results
Table 2: Membership inference attacks against natural and
empirically robust models [30, 45, 61] on the Yale Face
dataset with a l∞ perturbation constraint ϵ = 8/255. Based on
Equation (16), the natural model has an inference advantage
of 11.70%, while the robustmodel has an inference advantage
up to 37.72%.
Training train test adv-train adv-test inference inference
method acc acc acc acc acc (IB) acc (IA)
Natural 100% 98.25% 4.95% 4.09% 55.85% 54.53%
PGD-Based 99.89% 96.69% 99.05% 77.63% 61.69% 68.86%
Adv-Train [30]
Dist-Based 99.58% 93.77% 84.16% 56.23% 62.23% 64.25%
Adv-Train [45]
Diff-Based 99.53% 93.77% 99.42% 83.85% 58.06% 65.73%
Adv-Train [61]
Table 3: Membership inference attacks against natural and
empirically robustmodels [30, 45, 61] on the Fashion-MNIST
dataset with a l∞ perturbation constraint ϵ = 0.1. Based on
Equation (16), the natural model has an inference advantage
of 14.24%, while the robustmodel has an inference advantage
up to 28.84%.
Training train test adv-train adv-test inference inference
method acc acc acc acc acc (IB) acc (IA)
Natural 100% 92.18% 4.29% 4.11% 57.12% 50.99%
PGD-Based 99.93% 90.88% 97.53% 68.74% 58.32% 64.42%
Adv-Train [30]
Dist-Based 97.98% 90.62% 70.22% 53.13% 57.35% 59.91%
Adv-Train [45]
Diff-Based 99.35% 90.92% 90.57% 72.71% 57.02% 58.91%
Adv-Train [61]
Table 4: Membership inference attacks against natural and
empirically robust models [30, 45, 61] on the CIFAR10
dataset with a l∞ perturbation constraint ϵ = 8/255. Based on
Equation (16), the natural model has an inference advantage
of 14.86%, while the robustmodel has an inference advantage
up to 51.30%.
Training train test adv-train adv-test inference inference
method acc acc acc acc acc (IB) acc (IA)
Natural 100% 95.01% 0% 0% 57.43% 50.85%
PGD-Based 99.99% 87.25% 96.07% 46.59% 74.89% 75.65%
Adv-Train [30]
Dist-Based 100% 90.10% 43.61% 27.34% 67.16% 64.69%
Adv-Train [45]
Diff-Based 99.50% 87.99% 77.01% 47.28% 61.18% 67.08%
Adv-Train [61]
The membership inference attack results against natural models
and empirically robust models [30, 45, 61] are presented in Table 2,
Table 3 and Table 4, where “acc” stands for accuracy, while “adv-
train acc” and “adv-test acc” report adversarial accuracy under PGD
attacks as shown in Equation (9).
According to these results, all three empirical defense meth-
ods will make the model more susceptible to membership
inference attacks: compared with natural models, robust models
increase the membership inference advantage by up to 3.2×, 2.0×,
and 3.5×, for Yale Face, Fashion-MNIST, and CIFAR10, respectively.
We also find that for robust models, membership inference
attacks based on adversarial example’s prediction confidence
(IA) have higher inference accuracy than the inference at-
tacks based on benign example’s prediction confidence (IB)
in most cases. On the other hand, for natural models, in-
ference attacks based on benign examples’ prediction confi-
dence lead to higher inference accuracy values. This happens
because our inference strategies rely on the difference between
confidence distribution of training points and that of test points.
For robust models, most of training points are (empirically) secure
against adversarial examples, and adversarial perturbations do not
significantly decrease the confidence on them. However, the test set
contains more insecure points, and thus adversarial perturbations
will enlarge the gap between confidence distributions of training
examples and test examples, leading to a higher inference accuracy.
For natural models, the use of adversarial examples will decrease
the confidence distribution gap, since almost all training points and
test points are not secure with adversarial perturbations. The only
exception is Dist-Based Adv-Train CIFAR10 classifier, where infer-
ence accuracy with strategy IB is higher, which can be explained
by the poor robustness performance of the model: more than 56%
training examples are insecure. Thus, adversarial perturbations will
decrease the confidence distribution gap between training examples
and test examples in this specific scenario.
5.2 Detailed Membership Inference Analysis of
PGD-Based Adversarial Training
In this part, we perform a detailed analysis of membership inference
attacks against PGD-based adversarial training defense method [30]
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by using the CIFAR10 classifier as an example. We first perform
a sensitivity analysis on both natural and robust models to show
that the robust model is more sensitive with regard to training
data compared to the natural model. We then investigate the re-
lation between privacy leakage and model properties, including
robustness generalization, adversarial perturbation constraint and
model capacity. We finally show that the predictions of targeted ad-
versarial examples can further enhance the membership inference
advantage.
5.2.1 Sensitivity Analysis. In the sensitivity analysis, we remove
sample CIFAR10 training points from the training set, perform
retraining of the models, and compute the performance difference
between the original model and retrained model.
Figure 2: Sensitivity analysis of both robust [30] and natu-
ral CIFAR10 classifiers. x-axis denotes the excluded training
point id number during the retraining process, and y-axis
denotes the difference in prediction confidence between the
original model and the retrained model (measuring model
sensitivity). The robust model is more sensitive to the train-
ing data compared to the natural model.
We excluded 10 training points (one for each class label) and
retrained the model. We computed the sensitivity of each excluded
point as the difference between its prediction confidence in the
retrained model and the original model. We obtained the sensitivity
metric for 60 training points by retraining the classifier 6 times.
Figure 2 depicts the sensitivity values for the 60 training points
(in ascending order) for both robust and natural models. We can
see that compared to the natural model, the robust model is in-
deed more sensitive to the training data, thus leaking more
membership information.
5.2.2 Privacy risk with robustness generalization. We perform
the following experiment to demonstrate the relation between pri-
vacy risk and robustness generalization. Recall that in the approach
of Madry et al. [30], adversarial examples are generated from all
training points during the robust training process. In our experi-
ment, we modify the above defense approach to (1) leverage ad-
versarial examples from a subset of the CIFAR10 training data to
compute the robust prediction loss, and (2) leverage the remaining
subset of training points as benign inputs to compute the natural
prediction loss.
Table 5: Mixed PGD-based adversarial training experiments
[30] on CIFAR10 dataset with a l∞ perturbation constraint
ϵ = 8/255. During the training process, part of the training
set, whose ratio is denoted by adv-train ratio, is used to com-
pute robust loss, and the remaining part of the training set
is used to compute natural loss.
Adv-train train test adv-train adv-test inference inference
ratio acc acc acc acc acc (IB) acc (IA)
0 100% 95.01% 0% 0% 57.43% 50.85%
1/2 100% 87.78% 75.85% 43.23% 67.20% 66.36%
3/4 100% 86.68% 88.34% 45.66% 71.07% 72.22%
1 99.99% 87.25% 96.07% 46.59% 74.89% 75.65%
The membership inference attack results are summarized in
Table 5, where the first column lists the ratio of training points
used for computing robust loss. We can see that as more training
points are used for computing the robust loss, the member-
ship inference accuracy increases, due to the larger gap between
adv-train accuracy and adv-test accuracy.
5.2.3 Privacy risk with model perturbation budget. Next, we ex-
plore the relationship betweenmembership inference and the adver-
sarial perturbation budget ϵ , which controls the maximum absolute
value of adversarial perturbations during robust training process.
Table 6: Membership inference attacks against robust CI-
FAR10 classifiers [30] with varying adversarial perturbation
budgets.
Perturbation train test adv-train adv-test inference inference
budget (ϵ ) acc acc acc acc acc (IB) acc (IA)
2/255 100% 93.74% 99.99% 82.20% 64.48% 66.54%
4/255 100% 91.19% 99.89% 70.03% 69.44% 72.43%
8/255 99.99% 87.25% 96.07% 46.59% 74.89% 75.65%
We performed the robust training [30] for three CIFAR10 classi-
fiers with varying adversarial perturbation budgets, and show the
result in Table 6. Note that a model trained with a larger ϵ is more
robust since it can defend against larger adversarial perturbations.
From Table 6, we can see that more robust models leak more
information about the training data. With a larger ϵ value, the
robust model relies on a larger l∞ ball around each training point,
leading to a higher membership inference attack accuracy.
5.2.4 Privacy risk with model capacity. Madry et al. [30] have
observed that compared with natural training, robust training re-
quires a significantly larger model capacity (e.g., deeper neural
network architectures and more convolution filters) to obtain high
robustness. In fact, we can think of the robust training approach as
adding more “virtual training points”, which are within the l∞ ball
around original training points. Thus the model capacity needs to
be large enough to fit well on the larger “virtual training set”.
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(a) Membership inference attacks against models with different
model capacities.
(b) Adversarial train accuracy for models with different model
capacities.
Figure 3: Membership inference accuracy and adversarial
train accuracy for CIFAR10 classifiers [30] with varying
model capacities. The model with a capacity scale of s con-
tains 3 groups of residual layers with output channel num-
bers (16s, 32s, 64s), as described in Section 4.
Here we investigate the influence of model capacity by varying
the capacity scale of wide ResNet architecture [60] used in CIFAR10
training, which is proportional to the output channel numbers of
residual layers. We perform membership inference attacks for the
robust models, and show the results in Figure 3. The attacks are
based on benign inputs’ predictions (strategy IB) and the gray line
measures the privacy leakage for the natural models as a baseline.
First, we can see that as the model capacity increases, the
model has a higher membership inference accuracy, along
with a higher adversarial train accuracy. Second, when using a
larger adversarial perturbation budget ϵ , a larger model ca-
pacity is also needed. When ϵ = 2/255, a capacity scale of 2 is
enough to fit the training data, while for ϵ = 8/255, a capacity scale
of 8 is needed.
5.2.5 Inference attacks using targeted adversarial examples. Next,
we investigate membership inference attacks using targeted adver-
sarial examples. For each input, we compute 9 targeted adversarial
examples with each of the 9 incorrect labels as targets using Equa-
tion (19). We then compute the output prediction vectors for all
adversarial examples and use the shadow-training inferencemethod
proposed by Shokri et al. [42] to perform membership inference
attacks. Specifically, for each class label, we learn a dedicated in-
ference model (binary classifier) by using the output predictions of
targeted adversarial examples from 500 training points and 500 test
points as the training set for the membership inference. We then
test the inference model on the remaining CIFAR10 training and
test examples from the same class label. In our experiments, we
use a 3-layer fully connected neural network with size of hidden
neurons equal to 200, 20, and 2 respectively. We call this method
“model-infer (targeted)”.
For untargeted adversarial examples or benign examples, a sim-
ilar class label-dependent inference model can also be obtained
by using either untargeted adversarial example’s prediction vec-
tor or benign example’s prediction vector as features of the infer-
ence model. We call these methods “model-infer (untargeted)” and
“model-infer (benign)”. We use the same 3-layer fully connected
neural network as the inference classifier.
Finally, we also adapt our confidence-thresholding inference
strategy to be class-label dependent by choosing the confidence
value according to prediction confidence values from 500 training
points and 500 test points, and then testing on remaining CIFAR10
points from the same class label. Based on whether the confidence
value is from the untargeted adversarial input or the benign in-
put, we call the method as “confidence-infer (untargeted)” and
“confidence-infer (benign)”.
Table 7: Comparison of membership inference attacks
against the robust CIFAR10 classifier [30]. Inference attack
strategies include combining predictions of targeted adver-
sarial examples, untargeted adversarial examples, and be-
nign examples with either training an inference neural net-
work model or thresholding the prediction confidence.
Class confidence-infer model-infer confidence-infer model-infer model-infer
label (benign) (benign) (untargeted) (untargeted) (targeted)
0 70.88% 71.49% 72.21% 72.70% 74.42%
1 63.57% 64.42% 67.52% 67.69% 68.88%
2 80.16% 76.74% 79.71% 80.16% 83.58%
3 90.43% 90.49% 87.64% 87.83% 90.57%
4 82.30% 82.17% 81.83% 81.57% 84.47%
5 81.34% 79.84% 81.57% 81.34% 83.02%
6 75.34% 70.92% 77.66% 76.97% 79.94%
7 69.54% 67.61% 72.92% 72.82% 72.98%
8 69.16% 69.57% 74.36% 74.40% 75.33%
9 68.13% 66.34% 71.86% 72.06% 73.32%
The membership inference attack results using the above five
strategies are presented in Table 7. We can see that the targeted
adversarial example based inference strategy “model-infer
(targeted)” always has the highest inference accuracy. This
is because the targeted adversarial examples contain information
about distance of the input to each label’s decision boundary, while
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untargeted adversarial examples contain information about dis-
tance of the input to only a nearby label’s decision boundary.
Thus targeted adversarial examples leak more membership informa-
tion. As an aside, we also find that our confidence-based inference
methods obtain nearly the same inference results as training neu-
ral network models, showing the effectiveness of the confidence-
thresholding inference strategies.
6 MEMBERSHIP INFERENCE ATTACKS
AGAINST VERIFIABLY ROBUST MODELS
In this section we perform membership inference attacks against 3
verifiable defense methods: duality-based verification (Dual-Based
Verify) [56], abstract interpretation-based verification (Abs-Based
Verify) [31], and interval bound propagation-based verification
(IBP-Based Verify) [16]. We train the verifiably robust models using
the network architectures as described in Section 4 (with minor
modifications for the Dual-Based Verify method [56] as discussed
in Appendix C), the l∞ perturbation budget ϵ is set to be 8/255 for
the Yale Face dataset and 0.1 for the Fashion-MNIST dataset. We
do not evaluate the verifiably robust models for the full CIFAR10
dataset as none of these three defense methods scale to the wide
ResNet architecture.
6.1 Overall Results
The membership inference attack results against natural and veri-
fiably robust models are presented in Table 8 and Table 9, where
“acc” stands for accuracy, “adv-train acc” and “adv-test acc” measure
adversarial accuracy under PGD attacks (Equation (9)), and “ver-
train acc” and “ver-test acc” report the verified worse-case accuracy
under the perturbation constraint Bϵ .
For the Yale Face dataset, all three defense methods leak
more membership information. The IBP-Based Verify method
even leads to an inference accuracy above 75%, higher than the
inference accuracy of empirical defenses shown in Table 2, result-
ing a 4.5× membership inference advantage (Equation (16)) than
the natural model. The inference strategy based on verified predic-
tion confidence (strategy IV) has the highest inference accuracy
as the verification process enlarges prediction confidence between
training data and test data.
On the other hand, for the Fashion-MNIST dataset, we fail to
obtain increased membership inference accuracies on the verifiably
robust models. However, we also observe much reduced benign
train accuracy (below 90%) and verified train accuracy (below 80%),
which means that themodel fits the training set poorly. Similar
to our analysis of empirical defenses, we can think the verifiable
defense as adding more “virtual training points” around each train-
ing example to compute its verified robust loss. Since the verified
robust loss is an upper bound on the real robust loss, the added
“virtual training points” are in fact beyond the l∞ ball. Therefore,
the model capacity needed for verifiable defenses is even larger
than that of empirical defense methods.
From the experiment results in Section 5.2.4, we have shown
that if the model capacity is not large enough, the robust model
will not fit the training data well. This explains why membership
inference accuracies for verifiably robust models are limited in
Table 9. However, enlarging the model capacity does not guarantee
that the training points will fit well for verifiable defenses because
the verified upper bound of robust loss is likely to be looser with
a deeper and larger neural network architecture. We validate our
hypothesis in the following two subsections.
6.2 Varying Model Capacities
We use models with varying capacities to robustly train on the Yale
Face dataset with the IBP-Based Verify defense [16] as an example.
Figure 4: Verified train accuracy and membership inference
accuracy using inference strategy IV for robust Yale Face
classifiers [16] with varying capacities. The model with a ca-
pacity scale of s contains 4 convolution blocks with output
channel numbers (s, 2s, 4s, 8s), as described in Section 4.
.
We present the results in Figure 4, where model capacity scale of
8 corresponds to the original model architecture, and we perform
membership inference attacks based on verified worst-case predic-
tion confidence IV. We can see that when model capacity increases,
at the beginning, robustness performance gets improved, and we
also have a higher membership inference accuracy. However, when
the model capacity is too large, the robustness performance and
the membership inference accuracy begin decreasing, since now
the verified robust loss becomes too loose.
6.3 Reducing the Size of Training Set
In this subsection, we further prove our hypothesis by showing
that when the size of the training set is reduced so that the model
can fit well on the reduced dataset, the verifiable defense method
indeed leads to an increased membership inference accuracy.
We choose the duality-based verifiable defense method [56, 57]
and train the CIFAR10 classifier with a normal ResNet architecture:
3 groups of residual layers with output channel numbers (16, 32,
64) and only 1 residual unit for each group. The whole CIFAR10
training set have too many points to be robustly fitted with the
verifiable defense algorithm: the robust CIFAR10 classifier [57] with
ϵ = 2/255 has the train accuracy below 70%. Therefore, we select a
subset of the training data to robustly train the model by randomly
choosing 1000 (20%) training images for each class label. We vary
the perturbation budget value (ϵ) in order to observe when the
model capacity is not large enough to fit on this partial CIFAR10
set using the verifiable training algorithm [56].
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Table 8: Membership inference attacks against natural and verifiably robust models [16, 31, 56] on the Yale Face dataset with
a l∞ perturbation constraint ϵ = 8/255. Based on Equation (16), the natural model has the inference advantage of 11.70%, while
the robust model has the inference advantage up to 52.10%.
Training train test adv-train adv-test ver-train ver-test inference inference inference
method acc acc acc acc acc acc acc (IB) acc (IA) acc (IV)
Natural 100% 98.25% 4.95% 4.09% N.A. N.A. 55.85% 54.53% N.A.
Dual-Based 98.89% 92.80% 98.53% 83.66% 96.37% 68.87% 55.90% 60.06% 64.48%
Verify [56]
Abs-Based 99.26% 83.27% 86.21% 50.97% 43.32% 18.09% 65.11% 65.70% 67.05%
Verify [31]
IBP-Based 99.16% 85.80% 94.16% 69.26% 89.58% 36.77% 60.45% 66.25% 76.05%
Verify [16]
Table 9: Membership inference attacks against natural and verifiably robust models [16, 31, 56] on the Fashion-MNIST dataset
with a l∞ perturbation constraint ϵ = 0.1.
Training train test adv-train adv-test ver-train ver-test inference inference inference
method acc acc acc acc acc acc acc (IB) acc (IA) acc (IV)
Natural 100% 92.18% 4.29% 4.11% N.A. N.A. 57.12% 50.99% N.A.
Dual-Based 75.13% 74.29% 65.78% 65.37% 61.77% 61.45% 50.58% 50.43% 50.45%
Verify [56]
Abs-Based 86.44% 85.47% 74.22% 73.30% 69.69% 68.89% 50.79% 50.70% 50.59%
Verify [31]
IBP-Based 89.85% 86.26% 82.72% 78.57% 79.20% 74.17% 52.13% 52.01% 52.67%
Verify [16]
Table 10: Membership inference attacks against natural and verifiably robust CIFAR10 classifiers [56] trained on a subset (20%)
of the training data with varying l∞ perturbation budgets.
Training Perturbation train test adv-train adv-test ver-train ver-test inference inference inference
method budgets (ϵ ) acc acc acc acc acc acc acc (IB) acc (IA) acc (IV)
Natural N.A. 99.83% 71.8% N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A. 71.50% N.A. N.A.
Dual-Based 0.25/255 100% 73.1% 99.99% 69.8% 99.99% 68.18% 76.13% 76.16% 76.04%
Verify [56]
Dual-Based 0.5/255 99.98% 69.29% 99.98% 64.51% 99.97% 60.89% 77.06% 77.35% 77.09%
Verify [56]
Dual-Based 0.75/255 100% 65.25% 99.95% 59.46% 99.85% 54.71% 77.99% 78.50% 78.20%
Verify [56]
Dual-Based 1/255 99.78% 63.96% 99.44% 57.06% 98.61% 50.74% 76.30% 77.05% 77.16%
Verify [56]
Dual-Based 1.25/255 98.46% 61.79% 97.30% 53.76% 95.36% 46.70% 74.07% 75.10% 75.41%
Verify [56]
Dual-Based 1.5/255 96.33% 60.97% 94.27% 51.72% 90.19% 44.23% 71.08% 72.29% 72.69%
Verify [56]
We show the obtained results in Table 10, where the natural
model has a low test accuracy (below 75%) and high privacy leakage
(inference accuracy is 71.50%) since we only use 20% training exam-
ples to learn the classifier. By using the verifiable defense method
[56], the verifiably robust models have increased member-
ship inference accuracy values, for all ϵ values. We can also
see that when increasing the ϵ values, at the beginning, the ro-
bust model is more and more susceptible to membership inference
attacks (inference accuracy increases from 71.50% to 78.50%). How-
ever, beyond a threshold of ϵ = 1/255, the inference accuracy starts
to decrease, since a higher ϵ requires a model with a larger capacity
to fit well on the training data.
7 DISCUSSION: POTENTIAL
COUNTERMEASURES
In this section, we discuss potential countermeasures that can re-
duce the risk of membership inference attacks while maintaining
model robustness.
7.1 Temperature Scaling
Our membership inference strategies leverage the difference be-
tween the prediction confidence of the target model on its training
set and test set. Thus, a straightforward mitigation method is to
reduce this difference by applying temperature scaling on logits
[17]. The temperature scaling method was shown to be effective
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to reduce privacy risk for natural (baseline) models by Shokri et al.
[42], while we are studying its effect for robust models here.
Temperature scaling is a post-processing calibration technique
for machine learning models that divides logits by the tempera-
ture, T , before the softmax function. Now the model prediction
probability can be expressed as
F (x)i = exp (д(x)i/T )∑k−1
j=0 exp (д(x)j/T )
, (21)
where T = 1 corresponds to original model prediction. By setting
T > 1, the prediction confidence F (x)y is reduced, and when T →
∞, the prediction output is close to uniform and independent of
the input, thus leaking no membership information while making
the model useless for prediction.
Figure 5: Membership inference accuracy on robust Yale
Face and Fashion-MNIST classifiers [30] with varying tem-
perature values [17].
We apply the temperature scaling technique on the robust Yale
Face and Fashion-MNIST classifiers using the PGD-based adversar-
ial training defense [30] and investigate its effect on membership
inference. We present the membership inference results for vary-
ing temperature values (while maintaining the same classification
accuracy) in Figure 5. We can see that increasing the temperature
value decreases the membership inference accuracy.
7.2 Regularization to Improve Robustness
Generalization
Regularization techniques such as parameter norm penalties and
dropout [49], are typically used during the training process to solve
overfitting issues for machine learningmodels. Shokri et al. [42] and
Salem et al. [38] validate their effectiveness against membership
inference attacks. Furthermore, Nasr et al. [33] propose to measure
the performance of membership inference attack at each training
step and use the measurement as a new regularizer.
The abovemitigation strategies are effective regardless of natural
or robust machine learning models. For the robust models, we
can also rely on the regularization approach, which improves the
model’s robustness generalization. This can mitigate membership
inference attacks, since a poor robustness generalization leads to a
severe privacy risk. We study the method proposed by Song et al.
[46] to improve model’s robustness generalization and explore its
performance against membership inference attacks.
The regularization method in [46] performs domain adaptation
(DA) [52] for the benign examples and adversarial examples on
the logits: two multivariate Gaussian distributions for the logits of
benign examples and adversarial examples are computed, and l1
distances between two mean vectors and two covariance matrices
are added into the training loss.
Table 11: Membership inference attacks against robust mod-
els [30], where the perturbation budget ϵ is 8/255 for the Yale
Face datset, and 0.1 for the Fashion-MNIST dataset.When us-
ing DA, we modify the robust training algorithm by adding
the regularization loss proposed by Song et al. [46].
Dataset using train test adv-train adv-test inference inference
DA [46]? acc acc acc acc acc (IB) acc (IA)
Yale Face no 99.89% 96.69% 99.05% 77.63% 61.69% 68.86%
Yale Face yes 99.32% 94.75% 99.26% 88.52% 60.73% 63.14%
Fashion no 99.93% 90.88% 97.53% 68.74% 58.32% 64.42%
MNIST
Fashion yes 88.97% 86.98% 81.59% 78.65% 51.19% 51.49%
MNIST
We apply this DA-based regularization approach on the PGD-
based adversarial training defense [30] to investigate its effective-
ness against membership inference attacks.We list the experimental
results both with and without the use of DA regularization for Yale
Face and Fashion-MNIST datasets in Table 11. We can see that the
DA-based regularization can decrease the gap between adversarial
train accuracy and adversarial test accuracy (robust generalization
error), leading to a reduction in membership inference risk.
8 CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we have connected both the security domain and the
privacy domain for machine learning systems by investigating the
membership inference privacy risk of robust training approaches
(that mitigate the adversarial examples). To evaluate the member-
ship inference risk, we propose two new inference methods that
exploit structural properties of adversarially robust defenses, beyond
the conventional inference method based on the prediction confi-
dence of benign input. By measuring the success of membership
inference attacks on robust models trained with six state-of-the-art
adversarial defense approaches, we find that all six robust training
methods will make the machine learning model more susceptible to
membership inference attacks, compared to the naturally undefended
training. Our analysis further reveals that the privacy leakage is
related to target model’s robustness generalization, its adversarial
perturbation constraint, and its capacity. We also study the effect of
potential countermeasures against membership inference attacks,
including temperature scaling and regularization to improve robust-
ness generalization. The detailed analysis in our paper highlights
the importance of thinking about security and privacy together.
Specifically, the membership inference risk needs to be considered
when designing approaches to defend against adversarial examples.
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A FINE-GRAINED ANALYSIS OF PREDICTION
LOSS OF THE ROBUST CIFAR10
CLASSIFIER
Here, we perform a fine-grained analysis of Figure 1a by separately
visualizing the prediction loss distributions for test points which
are secure and test points which are insecure. A point is deemed as
secure when it is correctly classified by the model for all adversarial
perturbations within the constraint Bϵ .
Note that only a few training points were not secure, so we fo-
cused our fine-grained analysis on the test set. Figure 6 shows that
insecure test inputs are very likely to have large prediction
loss (low confidence value). Our membership inference strate-
gies directly use the confidence to determine membership, so the
Figure 6: Histogram of the robust CIFAR10 classifier [30]
prediction loss values of both secure and insecure test exam-
ples. An example is called “secure” when it is correctly clas-
sified by the model for all adversarial perturbations within
the constraint Bϵ .
privacy risk has a strong relationship with robustness generaliza-
tion, even when we purely rely on the prediction confidence of the
benign unmodified input.
B MODEL ARCHITECTURE
We present the detailed neural network architectures in Table 12.
Table 12: Model achitectures used on Yale Face, Fashion-
MNIST and CIFAR10 datasets. “Conv c w × h + s” represents
a 2D convolution layer with c output channels, kernel size
ofw ×h, and a stride of s, “Res c-n” corresponds to n residual
units [20] with c output channels, and “FC n” is a fully con-
nect layer with n neurons. All layers except the last FC layer
are followed by ReLU activations, and the final prediction is
obtained by applying the softmax function on last FC layer.
Yale Face Fashion-MNIST CIFAR10
Conv 8 3 × 3 + 1 Conv 256 3 × 3 + 1 Conv 16 3 × 3 + 1
Conv 8 3 × 3 + 2 Conv 256 3 × 3 + 1 Res 160-5
Conv 16 3 × 3 + 1 Conv 256 3 × 3 + 2 Res 320-5
Conv 16 3 × 3 + 2 Conv 512 3 × 3 + 1 Res 640-5
Conv 32 3 × 3 + 1 Conv 512 3 × 3 + 1 FC 200
Conv 32 3 × 3 + 2 Conv 512 3 × 3 + 2 FC 10
Conv 64 3 × 3 + 1 FC 200
Conv 64 3 × 3 + 2 FC 10
FC 200
FC 38
C EXPERIMENT MODIFICATIONS FOR THE
DUALITY-BASED VERIFIABLE DEFENSE
When dealing with the duality-based verifiable defense method
[56, 57] (implemented in PyTorch), we find that the convolution
with a kernel size 3 × 3 and a stride of 2 as described in Section 4 is
not applicable. The defense method works by backpropagating the
neural network to express the dual problem, while the convolution
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with a kernel size 3 × 3 and a stride of 2 prohibits their backpropa-
gation analysis as the computation of output size is not divisible by
2 (PyTorch uses a round down operation).
For the same reason, we also need to change the dimension of
the Yale Face input to be 192 × 192 by adding zero paddings. In
our experiments, we have validated that the natural models trained
with the above modifications have similar accuracy and privacy
performance as the natural models without modifications reported
in Table 8 and Table 9.
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